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1 Introduction 
 
 
We examine the market-based policies that have been adopted in Germany and 
the UK to encourage the development of renewable energy sources.  Each policy 
is assessed on the basis of two criteria: the price of power generated and the 
capacity installed. An analysis of previous experience gives an understanding of 
the problems encountered in implementing these policies, and the obstacles that 
prevent the realisation of policy objectives. A comparison of onshore wind is 
particularly interesting, since although the UK is widely acknowledged to have the 
greatest resource base, Germany is larger in terms of both installed capacity and 
generation.  
 
Sawin (2004) provides an extensive survey of renewable energy support policies, 
and much of our analysis draws on this work.  We also refer to other comparisons 
of wind energy development in the UK and Germany, which have often concluded 
that the policies adopted in the UK have established a competitive regime and 
driven down the price paid for wind energy (Klaassen et al, 2003).  The Feed in 
Tariff adopted in Germany does not expose project developers to price 
competition, and it is assumed that wind power has not been delivered at the  
lowest possible cost (see Menanteau et al, 2003). We interview developers and 
assess the impact of competition of wind turbine producers to supply to 
developers that exists both in Germany and the UK. 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Simona Dragosch for conducting the interviews in Germany and David 
Newbery for helpful comments.  The work is conducted as part of the UK research council funded 
Project SuperGen, Grant RG37889.  Contact Lucy.Butler@econ.cam.ac.uk, 
Karsten.Neuhoff@econ.cam.ac.uk, Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge CB3 9DE, UK. 
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 Whilst installed capacity has remained low in the UK, it has increased significantly 
in Germany.  This is often held to be a result of differences in planning system, 
rather than a result of differences in the market based policies, per se.  Here we 
consider whether the UK policy regime has generated a competitive market place 
for wind energy, and whether the observed decline in prices was a result of this 
competition.  We also consider whether the difference in build rates can be 
attributed solely to planning regimes, or whether it is a consequence of the 
renewable support policies.   
 
The policy regime for renewable energy was reviewed and adapted in both 
Germany and the UK at the end of the 1990s.  Given several years of experience, 
we can make a preliminary assessment of the impact that these new policies 
have had, and draw a comparison with previous policies.  In addition to looking 
backwards we also look forward and consider the likely effect on the price of wind 
energy and capacity installed. In doing so, it is important to take the difference in 
wind resource into account.  This analysis is subject to qualification, but does 
suggest that the price paid for wind energy is already lower in Germany than in 
the UK, and that this is likely to remain the case over the medium term.  
The analysis employs both industry-level and firm-level data.  Industry-level 
data, obtained from a variety of sources, is used to examine the changes in the 
price paid for wind energy and the growth of capacity in both the UK and 
Germany.  At firm level, we interviewed developers in both Germany and the UK.  
The interviews investigated the perception of the key obstacles to wind farm 
development, the level of competition at different stages of the value chain, and 
financial aspects of development 
 
Section 2 outlines the policy regimes in both countries, and employs industry data 
to consider performance against the criteria of price at which wind energy was 
delivered to customers and installed capacity.  Section 3 assesses barriers to the 
development in the UK and in Germany based on firm level data collected during 
interviews.  The aim is to identify whether the rate of commissioning was related 
to the design of the policy under consideration or to another factor.  Section 4 
examines the level of competition between developers and other firms operating 
in the industry, with the objective of determining whether competition was higher 
in the UK than in Germany, as is often suggested.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 2
2 Policy Assessment  
 
2.1 Background to Policy in the UK and Germany 
 
 
We give a brief outline of the policies adopted in the UK and Germany.  More 
detailed descriptions are given in Mitchell (2000), in Mitchell and Connor (2004) 
and in Bechberger and Reiche (2004). 
 
Between 1990 and 1998, the development of renewable energy sources in the UK 
was supported by the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO).  The NFFO was 
administered as a series of competitive orders in which renewable energy 
developers submitted bids specifying the energy price at which they would be 
prepared to develop a project and deliver energy.  The Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) determined the level of capacity for different technology bands, 
and the bids that should be accepted and offered contracts to meet this capacity.  
The Regional Electricity Companies were obliged to purchase all NFFO generation 
offered to them and to pay the contracted price for this generation.  The 
difference between the contracted price and the pool selling price, which 
represented the subsidy to renewable generation, was reimbursed using funds 
from the Fossil Fuel Levy.2 
 
Following the final NFFO order in 1998, renewable policy was recast in the form of 
the Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs).  Eligible renewable generation 
facilities receive ROCs corresponding to energy produced.  (1 ROC being equal to 
1 MWh of generation).  Electricity supply companies are obliged to buy ROCs 
corresponding to a fraction of total energy sales, set at 3% of generation in 
2002/3.  Any electricity company that does not obtain sufficient ROCs has to 
make buy-out payments (£30/MWh in 2002/3, rising annually in line with 
inflation).  These buy-out payments are recycled to suppliers that have presented 
ROCs, hence increasing the value of producing renewable energy for competitive 
generation if the quota is not achieved.   
 
In common with other Green Certificate schemes or Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, the ROC is based on market principles.  Shortage of renewable 
                                                          
2 This was levied on electricity bills, and paid by all electricity consumers.  The administrative body for 
this system was the Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency (NFPA), which was set up and owned by the RECs. 
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generation increases the value of the ROC, thereby encouraging market entry and 
a decline in the price of renewable energy.  The aim is deployment of renewable 
technologies according to national targets at least cost (see Jensen and Skytte, 
2003).  The ROC will therefore encourage deployment of the cheaper and better-
established renewable technologies unless additional support policies for newer 
technologies are adopted.  
 
The second basic mechanism to support deployment of renewable energy is the 
Feed-In Tariff, which was first adopted in California under the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (1978).  This required utilities to purchase power from 
'Qualifying Facilities', especially small renewable generators, at ‘avoided cost’ 
rates.  These rates, which reflected the marginal cost of acquiring the same 
amount of energy from an alternative source, were determined by the state utility 
commissions.  Many commissions pegged the rates to high oil prices, resulting in 
highly favourable guaranteed payment and stimulating renewable development 
(IEA 2004a).3  A further stimulus to deployment was given by the Investment Tax 
Credit, implemented in 1979 (Lauber, 2004).    
 
In Germany, the original policy (StreG, Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, 1991) required 
public energy supply companies to buy power as supplied by renewable 
generators at 90% of the average price of electricity as charged to final 
consumers in the previous year.  A decline in electricity prices, and thus in 
payments to renewable generation, prompted the introduction of a fixed tariff, 
effective from 2000 onwards (EEG, Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 1998).  For 
wind energy, this tariff was set at 9.1c/KWh for the first five years of operation 
and for the subsequent 15 years a reduced tariff of 6.19 c/KWh.  An allowance is 
made for the quality of the site, with plants that fail to meet 150% of a reference 
yield receiving the higher payment for a longer period.4 To take account of 
technological progress and incentivise early investment, the tariffs are reduced by 
nominal 1.5% for each year the investment occurs after the year 2002.5    
 
 
                                                          
3 The implementation of PURPA in California was particularly favourable to renewable generation, 
involving standardised long-term contracts with fixed payments for some or all of the contract term.  
The deployment of renewable energy was correspondingly high (Sawin, 2004).  PURPA remains in 
place, but the guaranteed prices for renewable generation are currently too low to support 
deployment (IEA, 2004a) 
4 This reference site is one with a mean annual wind speed of 5.5m/s at a height of 30m.  In the 2003 
amendment it was proposed that if a wind plant operator does not prove that the plant will reach at 
least 65% of the reference yield, the operator is not obliged to remunerate the wind power.  Network 
operators can make transfer payments to correct for non-homogeneous distribution of wind turbines.    
5 The tariff was subsequently revised to 8.7 c/KWh for the first five years and 5.55c/KWh for the 
following 15 years.  This payment is to decline at a rate of 2.00%.  
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2.2 Assessing the Success of Policies 
 
 
This section assesses each of the policies outlined above against the criteria of 
capacity installed and the cost of energy delivered per installed unit of generation 
capacity.  As wind speeds are higher in the UK, it is cheaper to produce one unit 
of wind energy (MWh) in the UK than in Germany.  However, we are interested in 
comparing policy instruments, and hence use the degression mechanism provided 
in the German Feed in Tariff to calculate what would have been the price paid to 
wind operators within the German feed in tariff had they produced one unit of 
wind energy in the UK.  
 
2.2.1 Capacity Installed  
 
The success of a policy designed to encourage generation from renewable sources 
may be assessed in terms of installations deployed.  On this criterion, policy 
followed in Germany may be considered more successful than that followed in the 
UK.  Figure 1 shows installed capacity of wind energy has risen from 48 MW in 
1990 to 4500 MW in 2000, when the EEG replaced the StreG (IEA, 2004).  Under 
the EEG, installed wind capacity rose to 8700 MW at the end of 2001 and 14,609 
MW at the end of 2003 (IEA, 2004).  By contrast, installed capacity of wind 
energy in the UK has remained low, increasing from 10 MW in 1990 to 649 MW at 
the end of 2003 (IEA, 2004). 
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Figure 1: Installed Capacity in Germany and the UK (1990 - 2003) 
 5
  
However, a more appropriate measure of success is not how much capacity has 
been installed, but how this compares to the targets set for the policy.  There was 
no specific target capacity associated with the StreG, the aim was simply to 
increase the share of electricity derived from renewable sources (de Vries et al, 
2003)6.  By such a broad definition, the policy can only be considered a success.  
Figures show an increase in the proportion of net electricity generated from 
renewable sources from 3.9% in 1991 to 9.11% in 2002, with the majority of this 
increase accounted for by wind installations (EIA, 2004; IEA, 2004).  The target 
set with the introduction of the EEG was a doubling of the 2000 contribution of 
renewable sources to reach 12.5% of total electricity generation in 2010.  
Assuming continuation of current installation rates, realisation of this target is 
likely.  
  
In 1993, the target for UK renewable generation was set at 1500 MW Declared 
Net Capacity (DNC) by 2000.7 Within each separate NFFO round, the government 
set a target capacity for each technology, which has not generally been attained.  
Thus, although the government awarded contracts for 3270 MW of DNC in 
England and Wales between 1990 and 1998, figures for September 2003 show a 
DNC of only 960 MW.   
 
The target associated with the introduction of the ROC was 3% of electricity 
generation from renewable sources in 2002/3, rising in each subsequent year to 
reach 10.4% in 2010.  In 2004, the obligation was extended to reach 15.4% in 
2015/16.  Most recent figures indicate that 3.24% of net electricity generated 
was from renewable sources (EIA, 2004).  This represents only a small increase 
on the 2.86% renewable contribution in 2000.  
 
In terms of both absolute capacity, and capacity compared to stated target, the 
German feed in tariff has been more successful than the NFFO. The introduction 
of the ROC has yet to generate substantial increases in capacity, with only 60 MW 
of wind capacity being installed in England and Wales since introduction (BWEA 
data, July 2004).  This finding is reflected in a broader comparison of policy 
                                                          
6 Note, however, that there were targets set for reductions in Carbon Dioxide emissions, separately to 
the EEG.  In 1990, the target was set at a 25% reduction on 1987 levels in Energy Related CO2 
Emissions by 2005.  
7 Broadly, DNC is the equivalent capacity of baseload plant that would produce the same average 
annual energy output as the renewable energy plant.  For wind farms the DNC is calculated by 
subtracting the on-site electrical power consumption from the installed capacity and multiplying the 
remainder by 0.43  
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undertaken by Sawin (2004:8), which concludes that 'feed-in systems have been 
responsible for most of the additions in renewable capacity and generation' whilst 
'the record of quota systems is more uneven'.  Similarly, Lauber (2003) and 
Menanteau et al (2003) conclude that feed-in systems have been more effective 
in terms of achieving targeted capacity.8  Section Three considers whether the 
differences in installed capacity in Germany and England are the result of these 
policies, and the other factors that may be of significance.   
 
 
2.2.2 Price Paid for Wind Energy  
 
Policy may also be judged on the basis of the cost of wind energy delivered.  Here 
we focus on the price paid to wind generators for energy, rather than on the 
overall cost of support.  This overall cost is likely to include network expansion 
costs and balancing costs, to which wind generators in Germany are not exposed, 
and which can be separated in the UK.  9  
 
Policy in the UK is often regarded as having been successful in bringing down 
prices, whilst that in Germany is criticised as having maintained high prices.  
However, the introduction of degressive remuneration under the EEG is likely to 
have reduced the difference in price (Menanteau et al, 2003).  Once the 
differences in wind resource are taken into account, Sawin (2004) suggests that 
the price paid to renewable energy under feed-in tariffs may have been lower 
than under the other policies.  
 
The first part of this section looks at the cost of the NFFO compared to the StreG.  
The second part considers how the price paid for wind energy in the UK and 
Germany is likely to evolve under current policy. 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Price of Wind Energy 1990 - 2000 
 
                                                          
8 Lauber (2004) calculates that Denmark, Germany and Spain account for 84% of installed wind 
capacity in the EU.  Each of these countries has implemented a Feed in Tariff. 
9 With the introduction of the new electricity trading arrangement in the UK (NETA) wind generators 
are exposed to balancing costs if their production differs from the announced schedule.  Part of this 
additional cost is caused by the requirement to provide additional flexibility, but exercise of market 
power and the objective to provide incentives to generators to minimise imbalances increases 
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Although the NFFO failed to deliver target capacity, it has been considered 
successful in that it drove the price of wind energy down to levels approaching 
the pool price.  This conclusion is based on the price awarded in the auction, and 
is rarely adjusted to take account of inflation, or of the lifetime of a wind farm 
development.  Here, we deflate price received according to the RPI and discount 
at a rate of 8% over a period of 20 years.  Weighting bids according to the 
proportion of contracts awarded in each size category, contracted prices fell from 
12.34p/KWh in 1990 to 3.99p/kwh in 1998.10   
 
To compare the price paid for wind generation under different subsidy schemes 
we make a number of assumptions.  When calculating the average revenue per 
produced MWh over the project lifetime (20 years), we assume a discount rate of 
8%.   
 
The decline in price is less significant once the increase in the length of contracts 
during which turbines received a subsidised electricity price under the NFFO is 
taken into account. Figure 2 shows a decline in the real average price of bids from 
8.50 p/kwh in 1990 to 3.6 p/kwh in 1998, under assumptions that reflect the 
expectations of developers at the time of bidding.11   In particular, it is assumed 
that after the expiry of the initial contract, developers are paid the pool price for 
electricity, which is projected at 1.5 p/kwh in future time periods.    
 
As a comparison the dashed line in Figure 2 shows the price paid under the 
German policy environment but scaled according to Figure 4 according to the 
better UK wind resource. If output is 20% higher, then the price paid per MWh 
can be reduced by 20% while maintaining the same revenue stream for the 
project and creating little additional maintenance costs.The German tariff after 
2000 is differentiated for different wind resources. The dashed line for that period 
gives the highest possible tariff (least favourable wind resource) scaled by the 
ratio between the average German and UK wind resources developed in the year.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
balancing costs.  To ensure equal treatment we exclude balancing costs from the analysis and focus 
on the revenue generators receive for their energy after subtracting balancing costs. 
10 Note that this is based on contracted sites, not on sites actually commissioned. 
11 In 2003 prices.  Prices are weighted to reflect the proportion of bids awarded to smaller installations 
and the proportion awarded to larger installations.   
 8
02
4
6
8
10
12
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
P/
KW
h
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
C
/K
W
h
UK
Germany
Germany (w ith UK w ind resource)
 
 
Figure 2: Anticipated Price of Wind Energy in Germany and the UK  
 
 
The feed in tariff has been criticised for being unduly expensive, with the price of 
wind energy falling only 18% between 1990 and 1999 (Federal Economic Ministry 
Advisory Council, 2004) compared to a decline of 67% in contracted prices in the 
UK.12  
 
This change in relative prices has been achieved despite a more favourable wind 
resource in the UK.  Dale et al (2004) quote a typical wind speed of 8.3 m/s in 
the UK, which compares to a wind speed of 5.5 m/s at the reference location in 
Germany.13  Moreover, evidence from developers suggests that over the latter 
half of the 1990s sites with a lower wind resource have been developed (see 
survey data).  Given the limited number of coastal locations with a high wind 
speed, the expansion of wind power has led to the development of sites of lower 
wind resource.  The EEG provided an incentive for such development, since 
variation in payment compensates almost completely for lower production.  The 
results of this policy are presented in Figure 3, which illustrates that the 
differentiated feed in tariff in Germany facilitated the development not only of the 
more windy coastal locations, but also of locations with fewer full load hours per 
                                                          
12 The price paid under the feed in tariff declined from 18.98 Pfennig/kwh to 17.19 Pfennig/kwh over 
this period.  The cost of support in the UK is given for real average prices, assuming a project lifetime 
of 20 years.  
13 Note, however, that this data does not necessarily represent the wind speed at the site of wind 
farms, since there may be difficulties in securing planning permission or grid connection for the sites 
where speed is highest. 
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year (Ragwitz et al, 2004).  By contrast, the low contracted prices of the NFFO 
encouraged early development of the higher wind speed sites wherever possible.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Development of Wind Resource under Feed-in Tariff   
(Source: Ragwitz et al, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the level of generation (MWh) per unit of installed capacity 
(MW) over the period 1990 to 2002. 14   This was initially low in the UK due to low 
turbine ratings at experimental sites, but increased with the increase in turbine 
rating throughout the 1990s.  By contrast, generation per unit of installed 
capacity has fallen in Germany - this is likely to be the result of developing less 
windy sites.  This situation has been compounded by a drop in average wind 
speed during the late 1990s (BWE Windenergie 2002).  Note also that the 
increase in turbine rating throughout the 1990s, a result of increasing hub height, 
has also contributed to the upward trend observed in the UK whilst preventing a 
further decrease in output per turbine in Germany.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Figures taken for the midpoint of each year, and assuming a uniform rate of build during the year.  
For Germany, this reaches a maximum in 1994 (2221MWh/MW installed capacity) and a minimum in 
2001 (1228 MWh/MW).  For the UK, the maximum occurs in 2002 (2681 MWh/MW) and a minimum in 
1992 (800 MWh/MW). 
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Figure 4: Generation for Installed Capacity (MWh/MW) 
 
 
Neither the NFFO nor the ROC schemes differentiate between available wind 
resource at different locations, therefore development of the least favourable 
location required to satisfy demand will set the marginal price.  Since total 
installed capacity is low, profit-maximising project developers have focused on 
the locations with a high wind speed.  If a successful expansion of wind 
installations results in development of sites with lower wind speeds, then the 
increased remuneration required at these locations will set the marginal price, 
and turbines at locations with higher wind speeds will capture scarcity rents of 
the high wind locations.  If high scarcity rents are to be avoided, a distinction 
should be made between sites according to the available wind resource.  This is 
recognised in the EEG, where sites of lower wind speed receive higher payment 
for longer.   
 
Costs of a wind turbine are fixed and only marginally affected by either the 
resource base or the annual production of electricity.  Accordingly, we can make a 
crude adjustment for output of wind turbines at different locations using the ratio 
of generation for installed capacity in the UK to Germany as presented in Figure 
4. Annual revenue (price received per MWh multiplied by the annual production in 
MWh) should stay constant when transferring a project between locations with 
different wind resources. The dashed line in Figure 2 gives the price that would 
have been required to fund a wind turbine, given the German policy and 
investment environment but the British wind resource.15  Making this adjustment, 
                                                          
15 We assume that the wind farm receives the high payment for the full twenty years of operation. 
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the price paid to wind generation in the first half of the 1990s is higher in 
Germany than in the UK, but falls below the UK level in the second half of the 
decade.  
 
This decline in prices once adjusted for wind output corresponds with the results 
of a recent survey of German Wind Project Developers by DEWI (DEWI 2002).  
This shows that nominal prices paid by project developers for wind turbines have 
decreased from approximately 900 E/kw in 1994 to approximately 820 E/kw in 
2001.  Inflation adjusted this corresponds to a decrease of 18%.  The relative 
small decrease in the cost of wind turbines is at first sight disappointing, as one 
might have expected larger cost decreases with the large-scale deployment of 
wind power.  However, Molley (1990) anticipated that with the increase of wind 
turbine size cost would at best stay constant as the increased turbine size results 
in a disproportional increase of forces and hence material in the turbine head.  
The ex-post analysis by DEWI (2002) shows that turbine manufactures 
compensated for the higher torque moments by increasing the torque moment 
per kg of material.  This allowed a reduction of the weight of the turbine head, 
which is related to the cost of the turbine head, per unit of installed capacity.  
From this perspective, significant learning is not reflected in revealed cost 
decreases but in the ability to provide larger turbines, which make better use of 
scarce wind sites.  Learning by developers, construction companies and other 
parties in addition to wind-turbine producers may also occur as capabilities are 
strengthened and development knowledge is acquired.  Mitchell (2000) suggests 
that the infrequent bidding intervals of the NFFO limited such learning effects. 
  
The trends illustrated in Figure 2 raise the question whether the price paid for 
wind power under the later rounds of the NFFO was viable over the longer term.  
In particular, the price cited is the average of all bids submitted and does not 
indicate whether installations have been built.  It is possible that the lower priced 
bids (and some of the higher priced bids) were not economically viable, and have 
not been built for this reason.  Survey data indicates that whilst all developers 
found NFFO rounds 1 to 3 profitable, only 60% of developers found NFFO 4 
profitable and only 40% did likewise for NFFO 5.  Those that indicated that these 
later rounds were unprofitable cited cost considerations as an impediment to 
development, or relied on parent companies to support development.16 To 
suggest that the low prices contracted under the later rounds of the NFFO 
                                                          
16 In contrast, all of the companies interviewed in Germany indicated that their developments were 
profitable.  Furthermore, none of the companies interviewed were dependent on support from a 
parent company. 
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represented the true cost of wind energy might be misleading.17  Accordingly, the 
conclusion that the NFFO has been more successful than the Feed in Tariff in 
bringing down the price of wind energy should be subject to further examination.   
 
 
2.2.2.2 Price of Wind Energy under Current Policy 
 
Having examined the historical price level, we now consider the price of wind 
energy under current policies, and how this price is likely to develop.  The EEG in 
Germany provided a digression mechanism that adjusts tariff payments according 
to the site-specific wind resource.  We can use this mechanism to calculate the 
remuneration an average UK turbine would receive under the EEG.  Rather than 
using the average wind speed in the UK, which may not reflect the accessibility of 
sites, the speed in the UK was estimated on the basis of speed at existing wind 
farms.  This gives an average wind speed of 7.04 m/s at 25m, which corresponds 
to 7.22m/s at 30m, compared to a reference wind speed of 5.5 m/s at 30m under 
the EEG.18 Given that power production increases non-linearly with wind speed, 
we assume that a turbine at an existing UK location will achieve at least 150% of 
the output the same turbine would achieve at the German reference site, which 
corresponds to the maximum wind speed that is affected by the digression 
mechanism.  
 
To determine the price paid for wind under the ROC we require the profile of ROC 
values during a twenty-year period that is determined by the new build in each 
year between 2002 and 2021. Both because investors in Britain are conservative 
in their expectations and because we want to get a lower bound to the costs of 
ROC we choose scenarios that are optimistic about the future deployment of 
renewables and therefore anticipate a low price paid for ROCs.  Following Mitchell 
and Connor (2004), we break down the value of the ROC into its components, 
and predict how each of these components will change in future periods.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
                                                          
17 In NFFO 5, contracted prices fell as low as 2.43p/kwh for those wind farms with a declared net 
capacity above 0.995 MW (see Dale et al, 2004). 
18 UK wind speed calculated using the DTI NOABL database.   
 13
01
2
3
4
5
6
7
20
02
/3
20
03
/4
20
04
/5
20
05
/6
20
06
/7
20
07
/8
20
08
/9
20
09
/10
20
10
/11
20
11
/12
20
12
/13
20
13
/14
20
14
/15
20
15
/16
20
16
/17
20
17
/18
20
18
/19
20
19
/20
20
20
/21
20
21
/22
p/
kw
h
Co2 Price
Levy Exemption
Certif icate
Energy Value
Recycled Green
Premium
Buy Out Value
 
 
Figure 5: Components of the Price Paid to Wind Energy under ROC (2002 - 2021) 
 
 
The buy-out value of the ROC is assumed to stay constant at £30/mwh until 
2010/11, after which it is assumed to fall on a linear basis in line with declining 
costs of technology.  Following Platt's Energy Journal (2004), we assume a high 
rate of renewable build such that the renewable obligation is met by 2010/11. At 
this date the recycled premium falls to zero.19 The value of the Levy Exemption 
Certificate is assumed to stay constant at 0.086p/KWh.  
 
The price of energy delivered by wind turbines is calculated by disaggregating the 
bundled price paid in the NFPA auctions.  This gives a value 1.66p/kwh in 
2002/2003 and 1.76p/kwh in 2003/4, which is lower than the value of energy 
delivered from less volatile sources.  This price is then assumed to decrease 
linearly to reach 1.5p/kwh in 2020, which is at the bottom end of the range 
predicted by the Performance and Innovation Unit (2002).20   
 
Finally, the implementation of the European Emission Trading Scheme will 
increase the (opportunity) cost of electricity generation by fossil power plants.  
                                                          
19 This is an extremely optimistic assumption, given the rate of build and perceptions expressed in 
other investor surveys (LEK, 2003).  Both indicate that it is unlikely that the 2010/11 target of 10.4% 
renewables will be attained.  The estimates for the value of the ROC, and thus the cost of wind 
generation, are therefore towards the bottom end of the possible range. 
20 Two counterbalancing effects apply here.  Energy prices are likely to increase, but increasing 
penetration of wind energy is likely to increase the wind discount.  It is unclear which one of these will 
dominate.   
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Based on Keats and Neuhoff (2004) we assume that an initial CO2 price of 10 
Euro/tCO2 in 2008-12 will increase the wholesale price by 0.3p/kwh.  We assume 
a subsequent linear increase in CO2 prices to 25 Euro/tCO2 by 2022, which will 
increase the wholesale price by 0.8p/kwh.  
 
To calculate a comparable price paid to wind generation under the EEG to the 
British wind sites we use two approaches. First, we assume that the average wind 
speed reaches 150% of the reference location in Germany, corresponding to a 
good wind site. In this case the high tariff is paid for five years, followed by 15 
years of the low tariff.  Figure 6 shows the average payment over a twenty-year 
project lifetime for build in a given year.  
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Figure 6: Expected Average Remuneration under the EEG and the ROC 
 
 
To derive Figure 2, we then assume the price received by a turbine at a very low 
wind speed site in Germany. The high rate is offered for 20 years. But then we 
calculate what rate would be required to provide for similar revenue for a UK wind 
turbine and therefore multiply the price with the ratio of German over UK average 
hours of wind production per year.  
 
Under the assumptions made and once wind resource has been taken into 
account, the remuneration provided under the EEG remains lower than the 
remuneration provided under the ROC until 2012.  At this date, the high rate of 
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build in the UK pushes down the recycled green premium to zero.  Under an 
alternative assumption of a lower rate of build, the remuneration provided under 
the ROC would remain higher than that under the EEG for a longer period of 
time.21 However, the German parliament can always adjust the premium paid for 
new projects. It did so in the past whenever it perceived the price paid for wind 
power exceed the costs incurred by wind power developers. 
 
Since the introduction of the ROC, the premium paid for wind power in the UK has 
risen to 4.6p/kwh (real prices, over a twenty-year life span).  By 2002, the price 
paid per MWh of delivered wind energy in the UK was roughly equal to the price 
of wind energy in Germany (see also Mitchell et al, 2004). 
 
 
Supporting Policies 
 
Although tax credits are frequently used to support renewable investment 
schemes (see later for a discussion of US policy), no specific tax credits for 
renewable projects are in place in either Germany or the UK.  However, 
developers in Germany have access to cheap finance through the Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank (DtA), a state bank that provides loans on concessionary terms.  
These loans are currently provided at 0.75% below the market rate (Allerheiligen, 
2004) which equates to an increase of 1.8% in the value of the Feed in tariff in 
2003.  However, in previous years these loans have been up to 2% below the 
market rate, and may have been a more significant source of support.22   
 
A number of other policies may also contribute to differences in the price and 
deployment of wind generation facilities.  In particular, the treatment of wind 
energy in the electricity market is likely to have a significant effect.  Under the 
EEG, electricity is remunerated at a fixed rate regardless of the load profile.  In 
the UK, the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) place a premium on 
reliable generation and penalise intermittent generation (for further details see 
Mitchell and Connor, 2004).  This is a particular problem for small independent 
generators, since such facilities are unable to balance their supply with alternative 
sources of generation.  Similarly, the Spanish Renewable Energy Association 
                                                          
21 Oxera (2004) anticipates that the government target of 10.4% renewable electricity in 2010 will be 
missed by about 2% - the resulting buy-out premia would increase the ROC value to about 38£/MWh. 
22 Given the relatively high cost of the less mature technologies, greater levels of support are required 
if deployment is to take place.  A range of policies to support solar energy has been introduced in 
Germany, amongst which is the payment of a higher rate under the feed in tariff.  See Bechberger 
and Reiche (2004) for further details. 
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recently observed that requiring wind generators to predict output imposes an 
unreasonable cost on small operators since it demands costly investment and 
penalises errors in prediction (APPA, 2004).   
 
2.3 Policy Assessment: Conclusion 
 
We conclude this section by summarising the record of each policy in terms of 
capacity installed and cost of energy delivered.  We first consider previous 
policies, and then assess the policies that are currently in operation.  
 
Under the NFFO, there was only a limited increase in capacity, with the larger 
part occurring in early rounds.  Although the average contracted price fell to a 
very low level, this price cannot necessarily be regarded as representative since a 
large fraction of the contracted projects were not developed.  By contrast, the 
StrEG supported a much larger increase in capacity.  Furthermore, when the 
difference in wind resource is accounted for, it would appear that the price for 
wind power development is lower than frequently suggested. 
 
Looking forward, the EEG may be more cost effective than the ROC.  However, a 
more conclusive assessment requires that the policy be reassessed at a later 
date.  The Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) exhibits initial success, with 
targets for 2005 met several years early and generation contracted for less than 
3c/kwh (Langniss and Wiser, 2003).  However, these results are dependent on a 
range of conditions that will not necessarily be met in future years.  In particular, 
power suppliers have been willing to sign long-term contracts for 10-25 years 
since the cost of wind generation is comparable to that of new natural gas 
facilities.  Such low costs are driven by a combination of high wind speeds and 
payment of the federal production tax credit (PTC). 23  Lauber (2004), for 
example, suggests that the high rate of deployment can be attributed to the 
near-term expiration of the policy, which gave suppliers the incentive to bring 
projects on line as soon as possible.24  It would therefore appear unlikely that the 
rate of deployment can be sustained under the RPS alone. 
 
                                                          
23 The PTC was created under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, and comprised an income tax credit for 
each kWh of electricity produced by wind energy installations built before the credit expired.  The 
value of this credit reached 1.8c/kWh in 2003, and was paid for the ten years following build.  The 
PTC expired at the end of 2001, but was renewed in 2002 before expiring again at the end of 2003 
(AWEA, 2003). 
24 As with the NFFO, a criticism of the PTC was that it encouraged stop and go cycles of development 
(IEA, 2004a). 
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The deployment of renewable technologies is likely to depend on a range of 
instruments (see Sawin, 2004).  The growth of wind power in Germany was 
supported in the main through the Feed in Tariff, but other policies were also 
important.  Similarly, the growth of wind energy following the implementation of 
PURPA was partly related to the investment tax credit.25  Although measures 
directly related to the deployment of wind energy are important, the wider policy 
environment should not be neglected.  The structure of the electricity market was 
of significance, as was the decision to phase out nuclear generation (Bechberger 
and Reiche, 2004).  An assessment of both past and future success of the policies 
adopted to support renewable energy has to take into account such factors (see 
also Mitchell et al, 2004).  
 
 
 
3 Why Regimes Differ in Delivering Installations 
 
 
We try to assess why the capacity installed in Germany has been significantly 
higher than that in the UK.  We disaggregate the development of a wind project 
into stages and asked developers to assign a rating to the problems encountered 
at each of these stages, with 1 representing no difficulties and 5 representing 
severe difficulties.  Since German developers seem to focus more on difficulties, 
their overall average rating was 2.5 compared to 1.9 for both the NFFO and ROCs 
in the UK.  We depict the deviation of the ratings in individual categories from 
these country averages (see Figure 6).  In addition, developers were asked why 
proposed wind farms had not been developed to identify the binding constraint.  
 
The most frequently cited obstacle to the development of wind energy in the UK 
has been planning restrictions (Gross, 2004; IEA, 2004; Sawin, 2004).  One 
explanation is that the successful bids have been for sites with a good wind 
resource, which are often in exposed locations, making it difficult to obtain 
planning permission.  Mitchell and Connor (2004) observe that the structure of 
the NFFO has exacerbated the difficulties associated with obtaining planning 
consent.  Wind farms were built at the same time in similar locations, resulting in 
a high level of opposition to development that persists today.      
                                                          
25 In California, large investment tax credits and long-term contracts led to a rush to install wind 
turbines, many of which were sub-standard.  Although this led to the development of wind generation, 
the industry collapsed when the policies expired (Sawin, 2004).  
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 The constraint that planning permission represents was confirmed in interviews 
with developers where it was identified as the most problematic area of 
development under the NFFO.  This remains the case under the ROC, although 
developers have suggested that the situation is improving somewhat.  This is 
confirmed by data from the BWEA showing a decline in the proportion of capacity 
that has been refused planning permission (BWEA, 2004).   
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Figure 7: Obstacles to Development: Relative Assessment by Developers 
 
However, data from a range of sources suggests that the difficulties involved in 
the planning process in the UK may be overemphasised.  Skytte et al (2003) 
report that the average planning time for a wind farm in the UK is approximately 
two years.  The planning process takes a similar period of time in Germany, and 
significantly longer in Spain where the average time is three years.  In neither of 
these countries does this appear to have constrained growth to the same extent 
as in the UK.   
 
Skytte et al (2003) also compare the risk associated with wind farm 
development.  Across Europe, obtaining planning permission is regarded as high 
risk in that it is both important for the investment and unpredictable.  Comparing 
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countries, the process is regarded as slightly more risky in Denmark than in the 
UK.  Despite this, we observe that deployment in Denmark has been significantly 
higher than in the UK.   
 
Furthermore, interviews conducted with German developers confirmed that 
difficulties in obtaining planning permission were a constraint on development 
(see Figure 7).  These problems accounted for all of the cases in which a 
proposed development was not completed.  The success of previous policy, which 
has resulted in high levels of development and a fall in land availability, is likely 
to be a factor contributing to this constraint.  Such a conclusion is supported by 
the difficulties encountered in site selection, with developers reporting that the 
lack of appropriate sites is now the most significant obstacle to further 
deployment (see Figure 7).  As a result, further development of onshore wind is 
likely to shift towards repowering existing locations.  Finally, we note that the 
problems reported may reflect competition between project developers.  As 
availability of appropriate sites declines, landowners are able to negotiate more 
favourable lease contracts, and in doing so extract increasing fractions of the 
expected project surplus (see subsequent section on competition).  
Consideration of industry data from the UK shows that planning permission does 
not account for all cases in which development is not undertaken.  Figure 8 shows 
that there have been an increasing number of cases in which planning permission 
has been obtained, but development has not taken place.  There has also been a 
significant increase in the proportion of developments for which no application 
was submitted.  We hypothesise that cost constraints are likely to play a role in 
both cases, with several developers indicating that the proposed installations 
were not economically viable at the bid price. 
 
 
 
 20
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
NFFO1 NFFO2 NFFO3 NFFO4 NFFO5
Granted and Built Granted, but not Built
Submitted, but not Granted Application not submitted
 
 
Source: compiled from various sources (BWEA, Country Guardian, company data) 
 
 
Figure 8: Planning Status of Projects with NFFO Contracts 
 
However, it is important to recognise the various interactions that take place.  
Planning permission increases costs, making it likely that the low prices submitted 
will become even less viable.  Moreover, a developer will use less effort to push a 
project through the planning permission process, if he expects low profitability.26  
Similarly, connection charges were cited as one of the aspects that could have a 
material effect on the viability of a development.  An investor survey conducted 
by LEK Consulting (2003) for the Carbon Trust reached a similar conclusion, 
suggesting the costs involved in connection and reinforcement can be prohibitive.  
Difficulties with connection seem to have increased over time, with it being 
considered more problematic under the ROC than the NFFO.   
 
The interviews suggest that obtaining finance was not regarded as a significant 
problem under the NFFO, despite indications that the level of competition in the 
market for finance provision was relatively low (see following section).  This result 
may be dependent on the company structure since almost half of the companies 
indicated that they had the support of a parent company, making financing 
easier.   
                                                          
26 Skytte et al (2003) also refer to the French EOLE scheme, under which the average contract price 
was approximately 4.5c/kWh.  Long lead times, partly due to lengthy planning procedures and 
burdensome administration, rendered any contracts unprofitable.  As a result, only 10% of contracted 
generation was being produced five years after the contracts were signed.   
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 Also of importance was the certainty of payment under the NFFO.  Developers 
indicated that this certainty made financing easier, although the contract was too 
short in early rounds (eight year) and acceptable contract prices were too low in 
the later rounds.  It is thus questionable whether a competitive tendering 
process, which places such emphasis on reductions on the price paid for wind 
energy, is the most appropriate means of encouraging an expansion in capacity.   
 
By contrast, obtaining finance is perceived to be more difficult under the ROC 
where payments are not guaranteed.  Although the price paid under the latter is 
currently higher than under the NFFO, there is concern amongst investors that 
the policy will not be continued over the longer term (see also LEK, 2003)27.  The 
financial support provided by the ROC is subject to considerable uncertainty.  The 
value comprises four elements: the price of power, the buyout price, the value of 
the Levy Exemption Certificate (LEC)28, and the recycled ROCs premium.  Each of 
these is subject to uncertainty, stemming either from policy change or from 
changes in supply and demand.  The recycled premium, for example, was 
reduced in 2002/3 following the bankruptcy of TXU and Maverick.   
 
Uncertainty can be mitigated by implementing long-term power purchase 
agreements (Skytte et al, 2003; Helby, 1997).  The initial success of the Texas 
RPS has been attributed to the fact that power suppliers have been willing to sign 
contracts with a term of 10-25 years (Langniss and Wiser, 2004).  However, the 
RPS would appear to be an unsuitable policy for driving the development of less 
mature technologies.  Although there has been a substantial increase in wind 
capacity, solar generation remains too expensive to compete with conventional 
generation even with subsidies (Langniss and Wiser, 2003).  Furthermore, the 
increase in wind capacity is in part dependent on the Production Tax Credit, which 
enabled wind generators to compete on cost (Lauber, 2004).  The high rate of 
deployment can be attributed to the near-term expiration of the policy, which 
gave suppliers the incentive to bring projects on line as soon as possible.29  
Again, supporting policies are shown to be important in facilitating the 
deployment of renewable technologies (see also section 2.3).  
 
                                                          
27 Mitchell and Connor (2004:1944) note that ‘the RO – put into place in 2002 and intended to last 
until 2027 – was being questioned by the White Paper within a year of its inception’.  It is inevitable 
that such political ambivalence will damage the credibility of any policy.  
28 Under the CCL, certain major energy users are able to reduce the normal CCL payment (0.43p/kwh 
on business customers) to 20% (0.086p/kwh) by purchasing renewable electricity. 
29 Both the PTC and the NFFO have been criticised for encouraging stop-go cycles of development 
(IEA, 2004a). 
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In Germany, as in the UK, the difficulties experienced when trying to obtaining 
finance depend on the structure of the company.  There was the perception that 
it was getting increasingly difficult to obtain finance for a number of reasons.  
Investors had been unsettled by long discussion of the EEG and attendant 
uncertainty.  This uncertainty has been compounded by a series of years with 
wind speeds below the long-term average wind speed.  It remains to be seen 
whether the payment guarantee provided by the EEG is adequate insurance 
against low levels of generation, or whether financing will become increasingly 
difficult. 
 
The results of the survey show that in Germany, planning permission (and related 
political factors) account for all cases in which development did not occur in our 
survey.  As the digression formula of the feed-in tariff facilitates development of 
lower wind sites, only sites which have low wind-speeds or which are difficult to 
connect would face binding financial barriers.  Such sites are likely to be 
abandoned in a screening phase, especially given the more stringent conditions 
proposed in the amendment to the EEG.  
 
In the UK, cost factors were also important, with low prices indicated as having 
inhibited development.  This is particularly the case in the later rounds of the 
NFFO where many of the bids were based on optimistic assumptions (see also 
Mitchell and Connor, 2004).  The ROC system has the potential to resolve this, 
since price paid to generation is much higher.       
 
 
4 Competition under German and UK Policies 
 
 
The rationale for the structure of the NFFO was that it retained significant 
elements of the market, whilst providing support for renewable generation.  It 
was expected that competition amongst developers would drive down the price of 
renewable energy close to the pool price.  Section 2 and 3 confirmed that the 
prices of awarded contracts indeed fell significantly, but that the selected projects 
were frequently not economically viable.  Developers in Germany, by contrast, 
have not been subjected to the same pressure to submit low prices.  Indeed, 
when prices received for generation began to fall due to declining electricity retail 
prices, the StreG was replaced with the EEG where tariffs were fixed.  
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 Here we examine whether the perception that the NFFO and the ROC encourage 
competition and that the Feed in Tariff limits competition is correct.  Price 
competition among developers is only one aspect of competition, and hence we 
assess to what extend competitive markets within the value chain are relevant 
and have developed.  First, we examine the level of competition between 
developers under the different policies.  Second, we consider the levels of 
competition between firms providing services related to wind farm development.  
We find evidence of significant commercial interaction between developers and 
between other firms operating in the industry. 
 
4.1 Competition between Developers 
 
Under the NFFO auction, the lowest bids that passed an initial examination of 
completeness and economic viability were awarded contracts.  The ROCs scheme 
in the UK produces some element of competition, in the way that the ROC price is 
market based, and hence supposed to represent the cost of a marginal wind 
turbine.  In Germany, developers did not bid prices at which they were prepared 
to develop a site, but were paid a fixed price, related to the retail tariff.  
Subsequently, the EEG introduced a differentiation based on the local wind 
resource, but once again, the developers were not asked to compete against each 
other to develop a project for a lower tariff.  However, the Feed in tariff should 
have encouraged competitive behaviour since it gives developers an incentive to 
reduce costs in order to increase their margin and profits. 
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Figure 9: Relative Competition between Developers30 
 
 
Figure 9 confirms that developers perceive bidding as the most competitive phase 
of the NFFO process, and encounter little competition at other stages.31 
Comments from developers indicated that there was significant pressure to 
submit low bids in the later round of the NFFO.  One German developer indicated 
that they had withdrawn from the UK market due to the severe competition at 
this stage.  
 
However, Mitchell (1994) questions whether this competition was significant in 
the earlier rounds.  Two thirds of the capacity contracted in NFFO-1 was 
accounted for by existing facilities and the prices were agreed in advance of the 
bidding process.  Competition increased in the second round when most of the 
contracts were for new capacity, but is still described by Mitchell and Connor 
(2004:1936) as ‘limited’.   
 
                                                          
30 Developers were interviewed on how they viewed the level of competition between developers at 
different stages of wind farm installation.  The stages identified as relevant were Land Lease (or 
purchase), Wind Evaluation and Planning, Operation, and in the UK, Initial Wind Evaluation and 
Submission.  Developers were asked to assign a rating to the level of competition with other 
developers at each of these stages.  These responses were then adjusted to give a relative level of 
competition 
31 The average response over all competition questions was 3.1 in Germany and 1.9 in the UK.  It is 
unclear whether the overall level of competition is higher, whether it is perceived to be higher or 
whether the difference is due to the interpretation by German speakers.  Therefore, the graphs only 
depict the deviation from the average level. 
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In Germany, the main source of competition among project developers is for 
sites.  This is confirmed by the results presented in Section 3 where site selection 
was identified as one of the most problematic stages for German developers.  
Land lease and purchase would not appear to be a significant problem under the 
NFFO or the ROC, a result that is a consequence of lower levels of development 
and better wind resource.  The increased competition for sites under the German 
Feed in Tariff is reflected in increasing payments to landowners (developer 
survey).  This competition can also explain some of the success of the German 
system in obtaining sufficient planning consents for new developments.32  The 
greater the competition for sites, the more effort developers will apply to 
convince the local community to accept a wind projects.  
 
The level of competition in operation is not significant in either Germany or the 
UK.  In Germany, the market structure in which operators take over a 
development does not generally apply.  Either developers operate installations 
themselves, or turbine manufacturers provide the service (Survey data).  This 
stage appears to be only slightly more competitive in the UK than in Germany, 
again this may be the result of practices in the market.  Developers may operate 
the wind farms, rely on partners to do so, or defer the decision to the owner of 
the wind farm.  The low level of competition in the operational phase of wind 
projects should be subjected to further research.  It is difficult to contract and 
verify that maintenance is performed to ensure the duration of a turbine life.  
However, given the increasing future expenditure on turbine maintenance it 
seems to be worthwhile to contemplate whether a development of this market 
segment should be facilitated, e.g. by increasing standardisation or provision of 
information.33 
 
4.2 Competition in Contracted Industries  
 
Competition among wind project developers to provide wind at lower prices is 
only one aspect of competition.  The ability of project developers to realise 
projects at low prices depends on their procurement costs e.g. for turbines and 
construction services.  As these procurement costs constitute the majority of the 
cost of wind projects, we assess competition among turbine producers, 
                                                          
32 Initially support was provided by national legislation requiring communities to identify and make 
available suitable sites for wind project developments.  However, increasingly developers succeed in 
convincing communities to make additional or better-suited land available. 
33 Currently most operational data of turbines are kept confidential and are frequently only accessible 
or fully comprehensible by the manufacturer. 
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constructors and finance providers.  We asked developers to assign a rating to 
the level of competition between companies providing these services.  The results 
were adjusted as for the competition among project developers and are 
presented in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10: Assessment of Competition in Wider Market 
 
 
There appears to be significantly greater competition in the market for turbines in 
Germany than in the UK.  This result is confirmed by industry data showing that 
the German market is split between a greater number of turbine manufacturers 
than the UK market.  Over the period 2000-3, just five manufacturers supplied all 
turbines installed in the UK (compiled from various sources).  In 2003, new 
installation of turbines in Germany was split between nine companies (IEA, 
2004).  This suggests that whereas the German market is of sufficient size and 
maturity to support competition, the market in the UK has not developed to the 
same extent.  Moreover, the data presented in Figure 10 suggests that the level 
of competition has fallen through time, a change that may reflect consolidation 
within the industry or withdrawal from the market.34  
 
                                                          
34 Again, this is reflected in industry level data, which shows a couple of manufacturers gaining an increasing market 
share (compiled from various sources).  
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We also note that German turbine manufacturers account for a significant 
percentage of both the domestic and the international market.  Two of the 
companies operating in the UK and five of the companies operating in Germany 
were of German origin.  Moreover, the international market is dominated by 
manufacturers from countries that implemented feed in tariffs, namely Germany, 
Denmark and Spain.35  Lauber (2004) suggests that the tariffs facilitated the 
development of the turbine industry by conferring security and encouraging 
market participants to adopt a long-term perspective.  By contrast, the emphasis 
that the NFFO and the ROC place on reductions in the price paid for wind energy 
is unlikely to facilitate the growth of domestic industry.  Instead, developers are 
likely to rely on technological advancements in other countries (Lauber, 2004; 
Menanteau et al, 2003).  
 
Finally, we note that quota systems do not encourage the development of less 
mature technologies.  In Texas, there has been a substantial increase in wind 
capacity, but solar generation remains too expensive to compete with 
conventional generation (Langniss and Wiser, 2003).  In the UK, activity under 
the ROC scheme has been largely restricted to onshore wind and landfill gas 
(Mitchell et al, 2003).  In turn, this means that market development and 
movement down the learning curve will be limited.    
  
The results obtained for finance provision suggest that the level of competition is 
not significantly different under the NFFO and the Feed in Tariff.  There appears 
to be greater competition under the ROC, which may be the result of general 
development in the market for wind energy.  Alternatively, the market-based 
nature of the ROC may have encouraged entry of financial service firms, although 
this would contradict comments made by a number of developers suggesting that 
the banks were concerned about the level of uncertainty under the ROC.  A larger 
sample, and greater experience of the ROC, is necessary to draw conclusions that 
are more robust.   
 
The results indicate only limited competition in the market for the provision of 
financing – a result confirmed by indications that for example in Germany only 
few commercial banks provide financing for major projects.  We do not know 
whether this is the result of lack of demand or supply.  On the demand side, we 
note that in Germany, financial support was given by the cheap credit provided 
by the DtA (see above).  Figures from the DtA suggest that initially between 80 
                                                          
35 Together these countries supplied 90% of turbines in 2002 (Sawin, 2004). 
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and 90% of wind energy projects in Germany were financed with these low cost 
loans (Hemmelskamp, 1998).  This may have delayed demand for commercial 
credit.  Furthermore in Germany some of the capital – one quoted number was 
25% - is provided through equity, whereas in the UK most of the ROCs wind 
projects are said to be financed on the balance sheet of utilities.  
 
Competition between developers and between firms providing related services 
has not been significant in the UK.  Survey data suggests that long and 
unpredictable time lags between NFFO auctions inhibited the development of a 
competitive market.  This stop-go cycle is also likely to have impeded both 
innovation and domestic industry, and limited the extent of cost reductions 
(Sawin, 2004).  We therefore suggest that the NFFO provided little opportunity 
for the realisation of dynamic efficiency.  Mitchell et al (2004) suggest that the 
ROC may have similar drawbacks since the emphasis on achieving reductions in 
the price paid for energy precludes both many renewable technologies, and entry 
by smaller producers.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: Competition under German and UK Policies 
 
The initial question confirmed that the NFFO generated a higher degree of price 
competition among project developers than either the Feed in Tariff or the ROC 
scheme.  However, the final price of wind projects is not only determined by the 
margins of wind project developers.  Most of the value is created in turbine 
production and construction – competition in these sectors is stronger in Germany 
than in the UK and margins are likely to be correspondingly smaller.  This 
competition is likely to have a greater impact on the final delivery price than the 
price competition in the NFFO scheme.   
 
We suggest that the Feed in Tariff should be depicted as a RPI-X regulation 
scheme.  The Feed in Tariff for new projects is adjusted every year, providing 
sufficient information for project developers to indicate their expected profit 
margins.  The Tariff is then fixed for the lifetime of a project, providing long-term 
security similar to that given by the NFFO contracts.  This security will facilitate 
financing and reduce capital costs associated with development.  When 
determining the annual price reduction, the authorities have to identify the level 
of the tariff that ensures targets are achieved with due consideration for 
efficiency and effectiveness (see also Skytte et al, 2003).  This only requires that 
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the profitability of project developers be evaluated, since it can be anticipated 
that project developers will try to obtain the best possible conditions for the 
services they have to contract.  
 
In the process of tariff setting, the authorities should be aware of the low level of 
competition between turbine operators.  As turbine developers frequently retain 
the operation of the wind farms, a favourable operation contract might provide 
for a channel to crate additional profits from a wind project.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that project developer sometimes obtain turbines below list prices and 
charge the list price to the investment fund: such profits should be attributed to 
the overall profit margin.  Furthermore, when setting the Feed in Tariff, the 
authorities should furthermore assess the contracts signed with landowners.  The 
strong competition among German project developers for new sites indicates that 
a large share of the margin between project costs and Feed in Tariff can end up 
with the landowners.  This is only desirable to obtain the individual, community or 
regional support for additional deployment of wind turbines.  If not required for 
these reasons high payments to landowners should be interpreted as a sign of 
excessive tariffs.  
 
The variable wind resources between different locations implies that with a 
homogeneous renewable premium (ROCs or Feed in Tariff before 2000) or with a 
fixed cut of value for the acceptance of wind projects (NFFO), the site with lowest 
wind speed sets the premium or cut of value.  The lower wind speed sites are 
only developed under these schemes if no higher wind speed sites are left.  
Hence, the high wind speed sites capture scarcity rents.  If competition among 
project developers is high, then this scarcity rent will be passed on to land owners 
in the lease contracts.  If competition is lower, e.g. because financing risk limits 
the number of developers to utilities with solid balance sheets, then the scarcity 
rent of high wind sites can be captured by the developer.  The Feed in Tariff of 
the EEG since 2000 successfully addresses this difficulty by increasing the tariff 
per delivered MWh with decreasing annually production.  It is a political decision 
down to what annual production level the tariff increase should be continued – 
currently 65% of the reference site.36 
 
                                                          
36 If the tariff were directly coupled to annual production, then no incentives would be provided for 
availability.  Hence, the average production of a turbine over five years relative to the hypothetical 
production of the same turbine type at the German reference location is used to determine payment. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
The NFFO and ROC schemes were expected to encourage the deployment of 
renewable energy at the lowest possible cost.  We observe that deployment under 
the NFFO was well below expected levels, and well below that achieved in 
Germany.  Further, the difference in the price paid for wind energy in the UK and 
in Germany is much smaller than is generally suggested, once the wind resource 
is taken into account.  Based on the initial experience with the ROC scheme, and 
making rather conservative assumptions about future trends, we suggest that the 
resource-adjusted cost to society of the feed in tariff is currently lower than the 
cost of the ROC, when averaged over the lifetime of the project. The long-term 
price guarantee provided by the feed in tariff reduces regulatory and market risk 
and might explain the lower cost. This confirms Sawin’s observation that a quota-
based system such as the ROC is not inherently cheaper than a feed in tariff, but 
that cost depends on a number of factors. 
 
A frequent criticism of the Feed in Tariff is that it does not generate sufficient 
competition.  However, our analysis revealed stronger competition among turbine 
producers and constructors under the feed in tariff than under either of the UK 
schemes. As these are the stages of the value chain, which contribute most to the 
total cost, increased competition at this stages might have a stronger impact on 
final price. We suggest that the Feed in Tariff should be depicted as a RPI-X 
regulation instrument, which seems to work well if project developers have a 
well-defined task and interact in competitive markets such that their profit 
evolution can be easily observed in order to set future Feed in Tariffs. If sites with 
differing levels of wind penetration are to be developed, then a resource-based 
differentiation of the tariff prevents owners of high wind sites from capturing 
large scarcity rents. We noted a very low level of competition at the operational 
stage for all three funding schemes.  
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